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Abstract
We show that no game form with an infinite set of outcomes can bestraightforward and that
no voting scheme with an infinite range can be non-manipulable.
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Gibbard (1973) showed that straightforward game forms with at least three
outcomes must be dictatorial and, as a corollary, that also non-manipulable
voting schemes with at least three outcomes must be dictatorial. Gibbard's
proof of these theorems does not require that the set of outcomes is ¯nite.
We analyze straightforwardness of game forms with in¯nite sets of out-
comes. We show that, as a consequence of Gibbard's theorem, when the set
of outcomes is in¯nite, no game form can be straightforward. This, in turn,
implies that no voting scheme with an in¯nite range can be non-manipulable.
2 Notation and de¯nitions
According to Gibbard, a game form is characterized by a set I = f1;:::;ng
of players with n > 1, a nonempty set X of outcomes, a nonempty set Si
of strategies, for each player i 2 I, and a function g : S1 £ ::: £ Sn ! X
whose range is X. An ordering of a set Z is a complete and transitive
binary relation on Z. Given an ordering R of X, a strategy s?
i 2 Si is R-
dominant for player i 2 I if g(s1;:::;si¡1;s?
i;si+1;:::;sn)Rg(s1;:::;sn), for
all (s1;:::;sn) 2 S1 £ ::: £ Sn. A game form is straightforward if, for ev-
ery ordering R of X and for every player i 2 I, there is a strategy which
is R-dominant for i. A player k 2 I is a dictator for the game form g
if, for every outcome x 2 X, there is a strategy sk(x) 2 Sk such that
g(s1;:::;sk¡1;sk(x);sk+1;:::;sn) = x, for all (s1;:::;sn) 2 S1 £ ::: £ Sn.
A game form g is dictatorial if there is a dictator for it.
Gibbard introduced the notion of a game form to generalize the notion
of a voting scheme, which he de¯ned as follows. A voting scheme is a game
form v such that, for some set Z with X ½ Z, Si is the set of orderings
of Z, for each i 2 I. A voting scheme is manipulable if for, some i 2 I,
for some n-tuple (R1;:::;Rn) of orderings of Z, and for some ordering R?
of Z, v(R1;:::;Ri¡1;R?;Ri+1;:::;Rn) ¹ Riv(R1;:::;Rn), where ¹ Ri denotes the
asymmetric part of Ri.
3 The theorem
Gibbard proved the following theorem.
1Gibbard's Theorem. Every straightforward game form with at least three
outcomes is dictatorial.
He then showed a corollary concerning voting schemes on the basis of the
following result, which we state as a lemma.
Lemma. Every non-manipulable voting scheme is a straightforward game
form.
This lemma provides a meaningful interpretation of the notion of straight-
forwardness of game forms. Gibbard's corollary follows immediately.
Corollary. Every non-manipulable voting scheme with at least three out-
comes is dictatorial.
Our main result, which we state as a theorem, is actually a further corol-
lary of Gibbard's theorem.
Theorem. No game form with an in¯nite set of outcomes is straightforward.
Proof. Let X be in¯nite and suppose that g is a straightforward game
form. Since X contains more than two outcomes, by Gibbard's theorem, g is
dictatorial. Let k be the dictator for g. Consider now an ordering P of X such
that, for each x 2 X, there is a y 2 X such that yPx and not xPy. As k is the
dictator for g, for every outcome x 2 X, there is a strategy sk(x) 2 Sk such
that g(s1;:::;sk¡1;sk(x);sk+1;:::;sn) = x, for all (s1;:::;sn) 2 S1£:::£Sn.
But then, there is no strategy which is P-dominant for k, contradicting the
assumption that g is straightforward.
From this theorem and the lemma, we can derive the following corol-
lary, which provides an immediate interpretation of our result in terms of
manipulation of voting schemes.
Corollary. No voting scheme with an in¯nite range is non-manipulable.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that, on unrestricted domains of orderings, there exists no
straightforward game form - and hence no non-manipulable voting scheme -
with an in¯nite set of outcomes. We leave as an open problem for further
2research the characterization of domain restrictions which allow for the ex-
istence of straightforward game forms and non-manipulable voting schemes
with an in¯nite range.
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